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GOVERNMENT BY INJUNCTION? *
CHARLES E. M~AHAN**
In trying to select some subject of public moment which may
be of interest to you, I propose to talk briefly about "government
by injunction", and will ask that you particularly remember that
there is a question mark after this title. In the newspapers,
periodicals and business conversations of the day, we hear of
government by injunction so often that it may be well to inquire
whether or not such a charge is well founded.
It is true that there is considerable potential dynamite in the
subject, but let me now assure you that every reasonable effort
has been made and will be made to avoid its political and class
ramifications, and so far as I am able, I will attempt to show no
bias or prejudice. "Government by injunction" imports the ad-
ministration and enforcement of the law by judicial decree rather
than by the legally constituted executive and administrative
officials.
No other branch of the law has become more vital or dominant
than that of labor relations, for in its broader sense it encompasses
practically all of the economic phases of human relations. There-
fore, early and throughout your practice of the law, it will be a
subject which requires your alinost daily consideration.
It is an important branch of corporate and business law and,
in this connection, I would like to quote to you from an address
by William T. Gossett, General Counsel of the Ford Motor Com-
pany, made at the Inter-American Bar Association meeting of May
24, 1949, as follows:
"The lawyer representing business today, if he is to live
up to the challenge of his new responsibilities, will endeavor
to avoid the errors of the past; he will shun the kind of advice
which is motivated by a desire to preserve the rubrics of a
vanished era; he will be alive to the social, economic and
political implications of the times; he will avoid a narrow,
shortsighted approach to his clients' problems; he will act with
due regard for the social responsibilities of the enterprise; he
will have the courage to advise against a business program or
device which, although legally defensible, is in conflict with
the basic principles of ethics. Failing this, he not only will be
*Annual uddress of the President of the West Virginia Bar Association to
the Student Body of the College of Law, West Virginia University, delivered
on March 27, 1950.
**President of the West Virginia Bar Association, 1950; member of the
Fayette County bar.
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ignoring his obligations to society, he will be doing a disservice
to his client,'who may find himself in the position of winning
a legal battle but losing a social war."'
With this preamble, the "issue" of the moment will be limited
to a discussion of certain phases of injunctive relief, authorized
under the National Labor Relations Act, and more particularly
the amendments and additions of 1947 officially designated as the
Labor-Management Relations Act and, commonly known as the
Taft-Hartley Bill, which latter has been vicariously referred to as
the "slave labor law", or "industry's Magna Charta", depending on
the point of view.
Those parts of the law which are alleged by some to have
revived "government by injunction" are principally found now
in sections 160 and 178 of Title 29, of the United States Code
Annotated, affording injunctive relief on two broad but distinct
bases, first, .for the protection of the national health and safety,
second, for the prevention of certain "unfair labor practices",
defined and prohibited therein.
In the first instance, it is provided in substance that where a
strike or lockout affects an entire industry or a substantial part
thereof engaged in trade, commerce, transportation, transmission
or communications among the several states or with foreign nations,
or engaged in the production of goods for commerce; and, if per-
mitted to occur or continue will imperil the national health or
safety, then, after a board of inquiry shall have been appointed
and made its report at the instance of the President, the Attorney
General, at the President's direction, shall petition the United
States court having jurisdiction to enjoin such strike or lockout
or its continuance.
However, it is further provided by the act that such an injunc-
tion, if granted, is limited in its scope and duration. It is solely for
the purpose of protecting the national health and safety and cannot
be used by individuals or for the protection or preservation of
private rights or property, circumscribed as it is by other provisions
of the act, among which are:
(1) The United States only may apply for and obtain such
an injunction.
(2) Such injunction may not be permanent but is limited in
duration not to exceed eighty days, during which voluntary
collective bargaining must be continued.
1 54 CASE & COMMENT (Nov.-Dec. 1949) 56, 59.
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(3) At the end of that "cooling off" period, the injunction
must be dissolved and the negotiating parties left to their original
rights, which presumably have been or are being settled through
the process of the National labor Relations Board and other
federal conciliation services.
Labor's principal complaint against these injunctive provisions
of the act is that thereby the government compels persons to work
upon terms of employment which not it, but the private employer,
has fixed and which the government has no power to alter. From
this flows the charge of the unions that it is a "slave labor law."
However, in the past two and one half years, the United States
has been compelled to and reluctantly has invoked these injunctive
provisions eight times, with varying results, mostly good.
It must be borne in mind that where a strike, either malum
prohibitum or malum per se, is enjoined, it is not the quitting of
work which is attacked but it is the concerted suspension of
employment which is the gravamen of the charge, upon which the
relief is based. In other words, it is the use of the strike weapon as
an instrumentality of an illegal combination, 2 which is actionable.
In emphasis of this distinction, there has been preserved in
the present Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, that part of
the original National Labor Relations Act of 1935, which, in
connection with unfair labor practices, specifically provided and
still provides that nothing in the law shall be so construed as to
interfere with, diminish or impede the right to strike. ' Section 5024
of the new law specifically provides that nothing in the act shall
be so construed as to make a quitting of work by an individual
employee an illegal act, and prohibits any court from compelling
any such employee to labor or serve, without his full consent.
Again it is emphasized that there is preserved to the individual
full freedom of action, and it is only the illegal combination or
conspiracy against which the injunctive relief may be directed.
As heretofore stated, the other injunctive features of the new
labor law, apart from those affecting the national health and safety
are not materially different from those which were contained in
the original Wagner Act of 1935, and relate primarily to the
judicial prevention of unfair labor practices as defined therein.
One of the great changes brought about by the 1947 act was that
2 Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U. S. 306 (1926).
3 29 U. S. C. A. §163 (1947).
4 Id. at §15.
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prior thereto, there were only prohibited certain acts of manage-
ment or the employer which were recited as being "unfair". This
sections was substantially amended and broadened by defining and
prohibiting six separate and distinct acts or practices which would
constitute unfairness on the part of a labor organization or its
agents. Many of these were related to or corresponded with the
five previously defined and prohibited unfair labor practices on the
part of the employer.
All unfair labor practices of both management and labor
may now be enjoined in the federal courts by the labor board
itself and upon its findings and orders, provided such action
receives the authority and approval of the office of general counsel,
which was created by the 1947 Act.8 It is again significant to note
that these procedures are not available, of right, to management
or labor individually, or to their organizations, but only as the
board and its general counsel may see fit to act, upon complaints
duly made and processed.
It was not until the Taft-Hartley Act recognized that labor
and its organizations, as well as management, might conceivably
be guilty of "unfair labor practices" and added the national emer-
gency provisions, which have been referred to, that we began again
to hear of "government by injunction". Under the 1947 act, certain
forms of picketing may be illegal, as constituting unfair labor
practices. Injunctions against picketing have within the past few
years intensified the long existent judicial conflict as to whether
by them are violated the constitutional guarantees of freedom of
speech and freedom of assembly. On these questions, the decisions
of the courts are by no means uniform,7 but the more recent trend
appears to justify such injunctions, in part upon the theory of an
unlawful conspiracy and in part in the furtherance of a statutorily
formulated national policy."
The implications of the very words "government by injunc-
tion" are obnoxious to the American concepts of freedom and a
government "of, by and for the people." Particularly are we
lawyers anxious to conserve and preserve the constitutional liber-
ties, as we see them. We are, in a sense, the voluntary sentinels
guarding against too much of an encroachment by what may be
29 U. S. C. A. §158 (Supp. 1949).
6 Id. at §153.
7 A. F. of L. v. Swing, 312 U. S. 321 (1941); Carpenters & Joiners Union v.
Ritter's Cafe, 315 U. S. 722 (1942).
8 1 LAB. LAW J. 3 (1949).
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termed the "common good", or "the welfare state" upon the
inherent and inalienable rights of the individual. Yet it is no less
our duty to recognize that an ever expanding and progressing
civilization creates new problems and complexities, which require
changes in the laws and their applications to humanity and to
its labor relations.
A brief historical background of how and when "government
by injunction" was conceived and its vicissitudes during the inter-
vening years, is essential to our present understanding of it, and
will be outlined briefly.
The Debs Case was brought to the United States Supreme
Court in 1895,9 involving an injunction in the famous Midwest
Railroad strike of that period, and the right of injunctive relief
was sustained. Injunctions in labor cases antedated that decision
but had not yet attracted national attention. In the Debs, as well
as in such earlier cases, criminal conspiracy afforded the customary
legal sanctions against labor unions and their activities. In the
1896 national platform, one of the major political parties declared
against "government by injunction". It is contended by many,
although ordinarily less than a majority in recent years, that such
party continues so to declare.
In 1908, in the Danbury Hatters case,10 the same Court held
that the Sherman Anti-Trust law, which had been on the federal
statute books for several years, applied not only to business re-
straints but to union activities as well.
Against both of these decisional doctrines organized labor
rebelled, and many union leaders created among their following
an antipathy towards the courts, which was to continue for many
years. Through the Clayton Anti-Trust law of 191411 labor activities
became unenjoinable if (1) carried on for a lawful purpose, and
(2) in connection with a controversy between the employer and
his employees. This was labor's first significant legislative victory.
In 1917, the United States Supreme Court decided in the
Hitchman case, 12 which arose from West Virginia, that a court of
equity could issue an injunction restraining attempts to organize
employees who were bound by a contract with their employer not
to join a labor union. This was a body blow to union organization
9 In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564 (1895).
10 Loewe v. Lawlor, 209 U. S. 274 (1908).
11 38 STAT. 730 (1914); 29 U. S. C. A. §52 (1947).
12 Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229 (1916).
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in new areas and new industries. The use of so-called "yellow dog
contracts" and injunctions to prohibit their violation became in-
creasingly prevalent. I recall sitting in the gallery of the United
States Senate Chamber more than twenty years ago when that
august body refused to confirm the nomination of Judge John J.
Parker of North Carolina as a justice of the Supreme Court,
principally on the ground that at one time he was credited with
having affirmed on appeal a "yellow dog injunction." In like
manner, there was afforded a political graveyard to many an
eminent jurist of that and the following eras.
The Clayton Act had failed to fulfill the high hopes of labor
for it and for almost two decades organizational activities lan-
guished and the ranks of organized labor were gradually depleted,
reaching an all time percentage low in the first years of the depres-
sion of the early 30's. From more than five million members in
1920, the ranks were reduced to less than three million in 1933.1',
The genesis of labor's resurrection was the Norris-La Guardia
Anti-Injunction Act, passed March 23, 1982,14 whereby the so-called
"yellow dog contract" was declared against public policy and void;
the courts of the United States were barred from issuing injunctions
in almost every form of controversy arising from a labor dispute
and all public policy favorable to union organization and collective
bargaining was thereby declared.
However, the continuance of the depression dimmed the
brilliance of this legislative victory of organized labor and, with
the aid of economic compulsion, industry soon learned to combat
organizational activities by interference of various kinds, including
the discharge of union "agitators" and the refusal to bargain.
It was then that the NRA provided for a code of fair competi-
tion and the "blue eagle", piloted by General Hugh Johnson,
spread its wings and provided a panacea for all of labor's ills, either
real or fancied. The pendulum began to swing quite farther to
to the left.
Again the burden fell upon the courts, upon which most labor
leaders of the generation already looked with suspicion and dis-
favor, to hold the National Recovery Act unconstitutional, and
the "dead chicken" case1" became national history. It was thereby
held that extraordinary conditions do not create or enlarge con-
13 22 ENCYC. BRIT. 384.
14 29 U. S. C. A. §§101-115 (1947).
15 Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935).
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stitutional powers of the government. The influences of this
decision were far reaching and permanent.
To take the place of the blue eagle, there was proposed by
Senator Robert Wagner of New York, and enacted by an over-
whelming majority in both branches of Congress, the National
Labor Relations Act of 1935, which popularly bears the name of
the "Wagner Act." By this, the labor injunction, as such, was
abolished, not regulated. It expressed the policy that labor unions
should grow, without setting forth conditions under which the
growth should take place. It left the government without a bi-
lateral policy governing labor-management relations. No order
could be entered nor enforcement provided against labor unions
and their agents, but the act was addressed solely against the
employer's wrongdoing.
From these conditions so created, it was inevitable that the
Taft Hartley Act, or some other similar legislation, should even-
tually emerge. It was the natural outgrowth of this evolution.
Though probably loosely drawn in many respects, and admittedly
subject to further proper amendment, the Taft-Hartley Act ex-
pressed the objective of equating rights with liabilities.
The Taft-Hartley Act"' integrated itself with the Wagner Act
and constitutes our national labor relations law, and shall so
remain, until and unless the eighty-first or some future congress
decrees otherwise. And like Aesop's fable of long ago, congress has
tried to please everyone, has pleased no one, and apparently "lost
its ass in the bargain."' 7
Time and space will not permit discussion of other statutes
and decisions affecting labor but not bearing directly upon the
present subject.
Let me again call to your attention that the federal legislation
with respect to injunctions as herein commented upon, is and must
be predicated upon and limited by the "commerce" powers and
provisions of the United States Constitution. However, under the
long continued and persistent trend of legislative declarations of
policy with respect to labor and high court decisions construing
them, which have been prevalent during the last decade or more, it
is now difficult to conceive any substantial economic activity, which
is not either "in commerce" or which "affects commerce".
10 29 U. S. C. A. §151 et seq. (1947).
17 1 AEsoP, THE MAN, THE DONKEY AND THE Boy (620-560 B.C.).
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However, the United States is not limited in its right to in-
junctive relief in matters of commerce only, as was typified in the
case of the United Mine Workers of America,18 decided in March,
1947, more than three months before the Taft-Hartley amendment
became effective. In that case the government had seized the coal
mines under the War Labor Disputes Act of 1943,19 and a tem-
porary injunction was awarded against the union and John L.
Lewis, its president, to inhibit a work cessation or "strike". The
Court held that since the Norris Act, which is often popularly
known as the Norris-LaGuardia Act, did not specifically exclude
the United States from injunctions in labor disputes, therefore the
Federal Government had the inherent right to prevent the stoppage
of production "for the War Effort and for the continued operation
of the national economy during the transition from war to peace."
The Court seemed to strain considerably at the philosophy of the
United States compelling its citizens to work for the private profit
of the coal operators, but justified its decision on the grounds that,
under its seizure, the miners were in fact employees of the govern-
ment, under a form of conscription, which had been provided by
the War Labor Disputes Act.
Be that as it may, the Taft-Hartley Act soon thereafter enacted,
can be and has been used to compel labor for private profit or, at
least for a period of eighty days, profitable or not, upon terms and
conditions in existence between the employer and the employee at
the time of its issuance. Judge Goldsborough held that an injunc-
tion under such circumstances was neither a.denial of "freedom of
speech" nor a requirement of "involuntary servitude." 2
In addition and in clarification of previously exisiting statutes,
as construed by this last mentioned decision, Section 30521 of the
subject act specifically provides that it shall be unlawful for any
employee of the United States or any agency thereof to "participate
in any strike". So swings the pendulum-this time to the right.
Before embarking on other branches of this subject, brief com-
ment will be made on the last injunction sought and obtained by
the United States under the public welfare provisions of the Taft-
Hartley Act. Rather belatedly, the injunction was applied for
and granted against the continuance of the recent coal strike, on
1s United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U. S. 258 (1947).
19 50 U. S. C. A. §1503 et seq. (1944).
20 United States v. International Union, U. M. W. A., 77 F. Supp. 563
(Dist. Col. 1948).
2 29 U. S. C. A. §188 (1947).
8
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 52, Iss. 3 [1950], Art. 4
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol52/iss3/4
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
the grounds that the health and safety of the American people
were in jeopardy. Unfortunately, either through design or political
expediency, the government was unable either to compel com-
pliance with the mandate of its court or to punish for contempt
those who violated it.
Constitutional questions most often raised in this class of
cases, other than those involving commerce, are "freedom of
speech," "freedom of assembly," "involuntary servitude" and the
"due process" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In the Debs case, as well as in subsequent cases, 22 the Supreme
Court held that federal judges have the power not only to enjoin
violent strikes and picketing activities, but also to regulate them,
as by defining the permissible number of pickets and the manner
in which picketing may be carried on.22 The Meadowmoor Dairies
case arose on appeal to the United States Supreme Court from the
state court of last resort of Illinois on federal constitutional ques-
tions, and it was there held that the use of injunctions to restrain
violence in the course of a labor dispute, did not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Of
course the Norris Act was not applicable, as it could regulate only
the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
Many of our states have statutes, most of which were passed
in recent years, regulating, curbing and prohibiting wrongful acts
of labor unions and their members. At common law and by virtue
of statutes in certain states, combinations and conspiracies or other
concerted efforts to damage or injure persons, property or rights,
by force, violence, threats, coercion or other illegal or wrongful
means, may be restrained by injunction, whether the injury is
actual or merely threatened. West Virginia has no such statutes,
except those relating to conspiracy under the so-called "Red Men's
Act"24 which the supreme court of this state has held was a statute
against "wilful trespass".=,
After the Clayton Act and before the Norris Act, the United
States Supreme Court upheld the right of the immortal Judge
McClintic, of the southern district of West Virginia, in the Red
Jacket case,20 to enjoin a conspiracy of the United Mine Workers
"2American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U. S.
184 (1921).
23 Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U. S. 287 (1941).
2 W. Va. Acts 1882 c. 135, W. VA. CODE c. 61, art. 6, §7 (Michie,' 1949).
25 State v. Porter, 25 W. Va. 685, 689 (1885).
26 International Organization, U. M. W. A. v. Red Jacket Consol. Coal
& Coke Co., 18 F.2d 889 (4th Circ. 1927), cert. denied, 275 U. S. 586 (1931).
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Union to "strike" the mines of nonunion operators in southern
West Virginia, as being in restraint of trade between the states.
This decision was in affirmation of a previous fourth circuit court
of appeals decision from the northern district of West Virginia,
wherein it was held that such injunctive relief was not dependent
upon public disorder or threatened violence, the emphasis being
placed on the disruption of commerce.2 7 These decisions followed
the pattern in the previously referred to Hitchman case. However,
the famous later Hutcheson case,28 bottomed on the Norris.
La Guardia Act, held unequivocally that labor union activities
were exempt from monopoly and anti-trust laws, thereby materially
limiting the field on injunctive relief in the federal courts.
Time and space will not permit a discussion of the evolution
of injunctions in labor disputes in the state courts of West Virginia.
It may be generally said that such courts have rather consistently,
although at times reluctantly, inhibited conspiracies and combina-
tions, which were held formed for an unlawful or a wrongful pur-
pose, or, which lawful in their inception and purpose, had resulted
in trespasses to or invasion of persons, property or rights, contractual
or otherwise. Typical are restraining orders against restraint of
trade, contractual violations, threats or coercion, in union activities
or for the furtherance of union purposes. These cases often arise
where a union has attempted to organize a nonunion plant or
industry, or has attempted to prevent work at a plant or in an
industry where a strike is in progress. They predominantly result
from various forms of picketing.
The trend in this state may be illustrated by a comparison of
the West Virginia decision of Parker Paint &c Wall Paper Co. v.
Local Union No. 813 in 1921, which held that a union and its
members who conspire to induce others to break a valid contract
with third persons, may be enjoined, if the loss occasioned thereby
is substantial, continuous and irreparable,2 and Blossom Dairy Co.
v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, decided in 1942, which
held that picketing will not be enjoined on the ground that it
tends or is intended to cause a breach of a valid contract with
others, when such picketing is otherwise lawful.A0 In the later case
a distinction that the former involved acts of violence was drawn
21 Bittner v. West Virginia-Pgh. Coal Co., 15 F.2d 652 (4th Circ. 1926).
28 United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219 (1941).
29 87 W. Va. 631, 105 S. E. 911 (1921).
30 125 W. Va. 165, 23 S. E.2d 645 (1942).
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but was certainly not convincing from a reading of the two deci-
sions. Perhaps the real distinctions more nearly lay in an ever
changing economic and political philosophy.
In many of the earlier West Virginia decisions, it appears
that union or labor organizations, as such, were restrained without
question. A milestone was reached in the 1944 decision of Milam v.
Settle, which, although it involved an action of trespass for dam-
ages, held unequivocally that a union or labor association has no
legal existence and cannot be sued in any form of action or pro-
ceeding3 This decision apparently will not affect, one way or
another, injunctive rights against union members individually or
others acting in concert or conspiracy.
Again let me emphasize that I have only tried to deal with
one of the many phases of the National Labor Relations Act as
amended and added to by the Taft-Hartley Act. 2 Only the fringes
and skeleton background of "government by injunction" have been
outlined in this limited time.
However, if, by reason of this discussion, any interest has been
aroused in tomorrow's members of our legal profession, awakening
them in a measure to the challenge of their economic and social
responsibilities in the practice of law, your time and mine will
have been worthwhile.
Although government by judicial fiat was not intended by the
franers of our Constitution, we lawyers still hope and believe that
our judiciary is the bulwark of our constitutional government and
is more immune to political pressure and mass or class compulsion
than other branches of the government. Only by the continuous
and continued integrity and vigilance of our judicial system can
we, in truth, "equate rights with liabilities" in management-labor
relations.
A unilateral government policy, either for or against labor,
capital or other class or creed, is dangerous and strikes at the very
foundation of constitutional government. When labor, organized
on an industry-wide national basis, can successfully defy the govern-
ment, in its apparent effort to protect the public health and safety,
it is challenge to us lawyers, which we cannot conscientiously ignore.
31 127 W. Va. 271, 32 S. E.2d 269 (1944); 1947 W. VA. BAk ASS'N REP. 110.
32 1948 W. VA. BAR Ass'N REP. 18.
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